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Gary R. Saxonhouse died November 30, 2006 in Seattle, WA, where he was being treated for 
leukemia.  Born in New York City in 1943, he attended Yale University, where he received his 
B.A. in 1964 and his PhD in Economics in 1971. He joined the Economics faculty at the 
University of Michigan beginning in 1970.  The selection of his published papers that comprises 
these two volumes is a testimony and tribute to his remarkable accomplishments and influence 
that were cut short by his untimely death. 
 
When he began his study of the Japanese economy at Yale in 1966-69, Japan stood out as a 
unique example of non-Western economic success.  But this success was not just a post-1945 
phenomenon. Already for the better part of a century, Japanese economic growth had outstripped 
the performance of every other major economy.  Yet, for some time, Japan was viewed almost 
exclusively as a model of a densely populated, resource-poor economy that other countries in 
similar circumstances might emulate. 
 
Impressed by Japan's continuing economic success, Saxonhouse began to look for explanations 
for its  economically efficacious adaptation and adoption of technological and managerial 
paradigms developed elsewhere .  In the late 1960s, there was already a large literature in both 
English and Japanese on Japan's aggregate economic performance. Reasoning that the tools of 
economic analysis at that time were more useful at the microeconomic level, Saxonhouse 
decided to focus his research more narrowly on the behavior of Japanese households and 
individual industries and firms. 
 
His first research analyzed the determinants of productivity change in Japan's cotton textile 
industry from its earliest days in the 1880s to a point some fifty years later by which time it had 
come to dominate global markets.  As the first important example of Japanese global success and 
based almost entirely on the assimilation of manufacturing technologies developed in Lancashire 
and New England, Japan's cotton textile industry deserved close scrutiny.  It was fascinating to 
study because of the availability of a virtually complete production record of each firm in the 
cotton industry throughout the first five decades of the industry's history.  Saxonhouse’s 
econometric analysis based on these virtually unique quantitative materials suggested that the 
Japanese cotton textile industry's half century leap in economic efficiency rested on its increasing 
ability to make productive use of a labor force of teen-aged girls whose typical entry rarely 
stayed more than six months in the industry.  The increasing sophistication of the methods 
employed to make effective use of transient labor went hand in hand with the increasing ability 
of the Japanese cotton mills to develop ever poorer quality cloth for sale in low income markets 
throughout the world.  Much of this research was first reported in Saxonhouse’s  doctoral 




The characteristics of Japan's premier industry during much of the first half of the twentieth 
century provide an astonishing contrast with what is conventionally assumed to typify Japanese 
economic behavior.  While there was great continuity in Japan's economic performance, it is 
noteworthy that its  economic institutions and economic strategies went through radical change.  
After becoming known as innovative producers of hitherto unknown low quality but inexpensive 
versions of conventional machine-made goods, Japan became synonymous with the production 
of high quality mass-market products.   Where once Japan's industrial labor force had the highest 
recorded turnover rates in economic history, permanent employment became the Japanese norm.  
And Japan's firms that had once creatively shared information with one another became 
hermetically sealed by comparison with their overseas counterparts, disclosing little except when 
required by Japan's government. 
 
The relationships between economic performance and institutional change first identified in 
Saxonhouse’s early studies shaped much of his subsequent research agenda.  His interest in 
making precise comparisons in performance and institutional change over time and over space 
first led him to an excursion in econometric theory. In the mid-1970s in a series of articles, he 
developed unbiased, consistent and efficient methods for comparing and explaining differences 
in parameters estimated from different time periods and from different geographic regions.  
 
In a somewhat different direction, Saxonhouse’s interest in how labor-market institutions and 
outcomes can change over time led him to the study of Korea under Japanese colonial rule.  
However rapid Japanese economic growth has been since the 1950s, economic growth in Korea 
has been still more rapid.  Despite harsh colonial rule and devastating war, Korea's labor force 
has come to be totally transformed.  An unskilled, indifferent industrial labor force given to high 
rates of absenteeism became transformed, over the course of the 20th century, into a major 
Korean asset, known throughout the world for its skill, experience and diligence.  This 
achievement is all the more remarkable because a non-trivial part of this transformation was 
accomplished while Korea was still under Japanese colonial rule.  While the Japanese were 
perhaps doubtful of its quality, Saxonhouse found that the Japanese learned how to make 
profitable use of Korean labor.  Koreans in turn acquired much of the skills and experience that 
laid an important part of the foundations for the remarkable post-colonial Korean economic 
achievements.  
 
Seeking to understand the relationship between economic performance and institutional change 
using a much larger and more diverse sample of evidence, Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright began 
in the late 1970s to study the development and migration of the cotton textile industry on a 
global basis.  Relying on the hitherto unexploited records of the English textile machinery 
makers who equipped most of the world's textile industry, and on published and unpublished 
reports by Japanese government officials, they sought to document and explain the differing 
responses around the globe to the challenge of importing and assimilating cotton-textile 
technologies.  Studying the experiences of countries as diverse as China, Japan, Russia, India, 
the American South, England and Brazil led them to conclude that industrial technology exhibits 
great malleability in successfully using very different types of labor in different settings on very 
different terms.  Thus, there is an essential indeterminateness to the social implications of 
industrialization at least so far as the requirements of technology itself are concerned.  At the 
same time, Saxonhouse and Wright were impressed by the continuing effects of institutional 
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systems, which having been established by human choice run their own course, generating 
behavior which is often mistaken for entrepreneurial brilliance or perversion.   
Having identified Japanese industries operating decades ago with great success using institutions 
and practices quite different from what later came to be the Japanese norm, by way of 
comparison, Saxonhouse began in the early 1980s to do more detailed work on the structure and 
operation of the post-war Japanese economy.  Looking first at the development of Japan's 
biotechnology and machine tool industries, he was struck by how new skill requirements for 
postwar Japanese industries interacted with Japanese government education policies to create 
powerful incentives for Japanese firms to maintain permanent employment practices.  It is 
interesting that such incentives were rarely present in early 20th century Japan and are largely 
absent in the United States today. 
 
Permanent employment has made it possible for Japanese firms to overcome the problem posed 
by the absence of American-style and European-style subsidies for the training of employees 
outside the workplace.  Compared with their overseas counterparts, Japanese firms provide an 
unusual amount of training for their employees.  While solving some problems, the growth of 
permanent employment as Japan's labor market norm has created new problems not earlier 
present.  Permanent employment, while creating training incentives, undermined many of the 
incentives that Japanese firms once had for the voluntary exchange of information.  In the 
absence of government intervention, the sharing of seemingly proprietary information, which 
was so common in Japanese industry decades ago, particularly in the cotton-textile industry, has 
become a very rare occurrence.  Indeed, the Japanese government's sponsorship of large 
cooperative R&D projects in the private sectors in industries such as machine tools and 
biotechnology are best understood as important, if very imperfect, efforts to break down the 
information-flow barriers created by permanent employment practices. 
 
Saxonhouse’s research on the Japanese economy in the years following World War II suggests 
that distinctive Japanese economic institutions are more often than might have been expected 
imperfect functional substitutes for, and not complements of, practices found in other advanced 
economies. This is true not only for permanent employment and government-sponsored, 
cooperative R&D projects, but also for such other well-known Japanese practices as industrial 
policy.  Until very recently the supply of capital had been heavily concentrated in Japan.  This 
concentration, which dates back to the 19th century and the emergence of large bank-centered 
industrial groups, not only made possible, but almost necessitated, a role for the Japanese 
government in shaping the allocation of capital. Without countervailing Japanese government 
pressure, and in the absence of market discipline, the complicated pressures of inter-industrial 
group politics could very well have frustrated economic progress.  Japanese industrial policy, 
while very useful for Japan, therefore appears to address problems not found in the United States 
and many of the other advanced industrialized economies.   
 
Complementing his research on Japanese industries and institutions, Saxonhouse turned to the 
study of Japanese trade structure in comparative perspective.  He became interested in whether 
Japan's distinctive economic institutions had a distinctive impact on Japan's trade structure.  
Given that Japan's manufactured imports had been and remained a relatively small proportion of 
total imports and of GNP, there was a long standing presumption that Japan's distinctive 
practices must be having a decisive impact.  However, if Japan's economic institutions, while 
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sometimes different from those abroad, often work in a functionally equivalent way, such a 
presumption may not be in order. 
 
Saxonhouse noted that economic theory does not dictate that countries with similar per capita 
GNPs should have manufactured imports that bear more or less the same proportion to total 
imports, GNP or population.  Before such comparisons among advanced industrialized countries 
can be made, allowance must be made for differences in natural resource endowments, distance 
from trading partners, and differences in the quantity and quality of labor and capital among 
other factors.  Saxonhouse concluded that in order to make such comparisons in a meaningful 
way, the theory of comparative advantage had to be applied directly to cross-national data. 
 
Saxonhouse was surprised that applying the theory of comparative advantage proved more 
challenging than he had first anticipated.  While the algebra of the theory of comparative 
advantage had been long ago worked out by trade theorists, at the time in the early 1980s when 
he began his research, the actual tests of the theory seemed to make little use of this formal 
framework.  Often the functional forms imposed in these tests could not be derived from 
comparative advantage mathematics.  It appeared that the reluctance to make direct empirical use 
of the formal framework rested in part on the extreme counterintuitive assumptions required.  
For example, these included the assumption that wages are everywhere equal throughout the 
world.  By applying a multiplicative errors-in-variable framework which implicitly allows for 
different qualities of labor, capital and natural resources, Saxonhouse was able to greatly weaken 
the force of such extreme assumptions, but at the same time to apply the formal theoretical 
structure in an intellectually rigorous fashion. 
 
The results of his empirical research suggested that when due allowance is made for Japan's 
distinctive national resources and geography, Japan's trade structure can be almost fully 
explained.  That is, there was little variance left to be explained by Japan's distinctive economic 
institutions.  These results had considerable policy significance.  Due to both foreign and 
domestic political pressure, many of Japan's distinctive economic institutions had undergone 
significant change.  It was therefore a mistake to assume that there was necessarily an intimate 
connection between such changes and the structure of Japanese trade.  Saxonhouse subsequently 
attempted to deepen this analysis. The traditional theory of comparative advantage rules out 
economies of scale and assumes each industry produces only one type of good or service.  
Recent developments in the theory of international trade made it possible to sensibly incorporate 
both economies of scale and a wide variety of goods being produced by a single industry.  These 
new developments made it possible to explain not only the net exports or net imports of a 
particular sector but also gross exports and gross imports.  Since it was often suggested that 
Japan's gross trade flows and not its net trade flows were unusual, these developments were 
highly significant for many of the questions that Saxonhouse had been researching. 
 
In an effort to incorporate these theoretical developments into his research, Saxonhouse was able 
to show how empirical work can be done using this theory in a way that is entirely faithful to its 
algebraic structure.  He was also able to show how the framework used in his earlier work was a 
special case of this more general structure.  In applying this more general framework to cross-
national data, he once again found that Japan's distinctive economic institutions did not appear to 
have a distinctive impact on Japanese trade structure.  Japan's national endowments and 
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geography explained not only Japan's net trade but also its gross trade.  If Japan's distinctive 
economic practices have an impact, it is through macroeconomic aggregates and not, as 
generally imagined, at the sectoral level.  Both because of its intellectual significance for how 
Japan’s economy is understood and because of its obvious policy importance in understanding 
Japanese trade structure, interest in a substantial new literature was created. 
 
 In the mid-1990s, Saxonhouse began to explore other methods for testing hypotheses about the 
behavior of Japanese economic institutions. Instead of trying to examine the impact of Japanese 
economic institutions taken together on Japanese trade structure, he sought to explore the impact 
of specific government actions such as the creation of joint government-business R&D projects. 
Here, he   examined the impact of such new initiatives on equity markets not only in Japan but 
also in the United States.  Curiously, he found that while Japanese equity markets did not expect 
that the joint R&D projects would benefit Japanese participants, American equity markets 
anticipated a negative impact from these projects on their American competitors.  
 
The results for the Japanese and American markets seemed inconsistent with one another. They 
could be reconciled if the Japanese markets assumed that whatever benefits these firms might 
receive from participating will be taxed away. Alternatively, the Japanese government already by 
the mid-1980s was not, if it had ever been, a major source of support for the development of new 
technologies. Where once government may have signaled the private sector about the direction 
that incremental investment might take, with financial deregulation and technological maturity 
this role may no longer have been either possible or necessary. This same technological maturity 
that makes signaling to the private sector so difficult might also make even a coordinating role 
for the Japanese government troublesome. Such an interpretation might not seem so surprising at 
a time of economic stagnation in Japan, but it may well be that American equity markets may 
take a long time to appreciate that Japanese economic institutions had changed. 
 
In early 2000, Saxonhouse commenced an entirely new line of research focused on Japanese 
legal institutions. Reworking Japanese and American judicial system data, he discovered, 
contrary to conventional understanding and notwithstanding the higher probability of conviction 
in Japan than in the United States, Japanese defendants were more likely to contest their guilt at 
trial. In attempting to understand how this might happen, he was able to develop a class of 
models that showed under quite general conditions that the less certain the outcome of trial, the 
less likely it is that even a risk neutral defendant would go to trial. 
 
Japan is beginning to take steps that may lead to the re-introduction of a jury system last used in 
any form in the early 1940s. Juries may or may not be better in dealing with facts on average 
than judges. The very diversity of juries, however, that some say could make them better at 
evaluating evidence surely introduces a larger variance in the outcome of a trial. This additional 
uncertainty means that a Japanese judicial system operating with juries will save Japanese 
resources because fewer cases will go to trial. Counter-intuitively, unpredictable courts are found 
to be social welfare enhancing. The downside of this unpredictability is that it provides people 
without valid claims to obtain undeserved payments from defendants. This causes some socially 




Also in 2000, Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright renewed their joint research on global diffusion and 
adaptation of textile technologies. New developments in computer hardware and software made 
it possible to conduct analyses on a data set of over 30,000 observations on the more than 30 
variables characterizing each machinery order, something that was not feasible previously. This 
renewed collaboration produced a series of papers showing the relative importance in 
technological choice of a firm’s previous experience with the technology and its alternatives, the 
current technological frontier, both at home and abroad as seen from the firm’s perspective, and 
the firm’s expectations about the movement of this technological frontier based on both domestic 
and foreign information. 
 
Saxonhouse wrote a number of papers over the years dealing with Japanese macro-financial and 
exchange rate issues and with Japan-U.S. international economic relations.  He co-directed with 
Robert M. Stern two programs of research in 1999-2004 that were funded by the Japan 
Foundation’s Center for Global Partnership on Japan-U.S. issues and that led to a series of 
journal and book publications.  Of particular interest is a 2005 paper that Saxonhouse wrote on 
“Good Deflation/Bad Deflation and Japanese Economic Recovery,” which looked at issues of 
Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990s in an historical context. 
 
Saxonhouse’s renewed work on the history of the textile industry, together with his longstanding, 
but hitherto separate interests in international economic relations and labor markets, led him in 
2002  to begin to gather materials about and formulate a research design  for a project on “The 
Evolution of Labor Standards in Japan: Human Rights, Scientific Management and International 
Economic Diplomacy.”  He received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2005-06 to pursue this 
research.  He was the keynote speaker in April 2006 at the All-Chicago Conference on Economic 
History on the topic, “The Evolution of Labor Standards in Japan.”  However, his illness 
prevented him from completing this project.  During the onset of his illness, he worked also on 
papers and seminar presentations with Gavin Wright on competing paradigms in spinning 
technology, “The Integration of Giants into the Global Economy” presented at Yale and 
published by the American Economic Institute, and “Hachiro Fukuhara, Scholar-Statesman, Ring 
Spinner, and Industrial Spy?” presented at Northwestern University. 
 
At the University of Michigan, Saxonhouse taught regularly undergraduate and graduate courses 
on the  Japanese economy.  He trained many of today’s American economists who specialized on 
Japan as well as a number of Japanese economists and many members of Japan’s civil service 
who were on leave to study at Michigan. 
 
Saxonhouse received many honors for his work, including fellowships from the Guggenheim 
Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences, and the Institute for Advanced Study. He visited Brown University as the 
Henry R. Luce Professor of Comparative Development, he received a coveted residency at the 
Bellagio Center of the Rockefeller Foundation, and was a Distinguished Lecturer at the 
Northeast Asia Council of the Association of Asian Studies.  He was a frequent recipient of the 





Saxonhouse’s public service included a member of the senior staff of the U.S. President's 
Council of Economic Advisers and a consultant for the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and 
Commerce, and the World Bank. He also testified on numerous occasions before Congressional 
committees and served on advisory panels to the U.S. Congress on the civilian uses of space, 
industrial competitiveness, and the American economy.  In Japan, he was a member of the 
American advisory board of the Japan Foundation and the academic advisory committee of the 
Policy Research Institute in the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Overview 
The selections of Saxonhouse’s published writings have been divided into the following 
classifications:  Economic History; Technology and Innovation; Comparative Advantage, Trade, 
and Trade Policies; and Macro-Financial Issues and Policies.  The selected writings in Economic 
History are contained in Volume 1, and the other selected writings are contained in Volume 2.  
The selected writings are only part of the large number of papers that Saxonhouse published 
during his career, as will be evident from the list of his writings that is contained in an appendix 
to Volume 2. 
 
In what follows, we have prepared brief summaries of the papers presented below that are 





“A Tale of Technological Diffusion in the Meiji Period,” Journal of Economic History 34 
(March 1974): 149-165 
This paper describes and analyzes the remarkable uniformity of practice in the Japanese cotton 
spinning industry, strikingly illustrated by the switch from mules to rings between 1887 and 
1888.  Whereas economic historians now have well-developed frameworks to explain lags in 
diffusion and the persistence of older techniques, in this case the transition occurred virtually 
overnight!  Making use of the uniquely rich quantitative record, Saxonhouse estimates a cross-
firm production function with shift parameters, and is unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
technological uniformity.  The article attributes this uniformity to institutional arrangements that 
facilitated the flow of information between firms. 
“Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the Japanese Cotton-Spinning 
Industry,” in Hugh Patrick (ed.), Japanese Industrialization and Its Social Consequences.  
University of California Press, 1976: 97-125. 
This paper shows that the Japanese cotton textile industry’s labor force was predominantly 
female and short-term, displaying turnover rates that were extremely high by international 
standards.  The typical worker departed after only two years of service, usually without 
permission.  Average experience levels increased over time, not because turnover behavior 
changed, but because a small group from each cohort stayed longer, gradually accumulating a 
core of experience over time.  A production function estimate shows that worker experience had 
a significant impact on productivity. The paper explains this apparent managerial failure by 
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appealing to the high degree of technical uniformity within the industry, making it difficult for 
any one employer to recoup the costs of investment in the human capital of their workers. 
“Productivity Change and Labor Absorption in Japanese Cotton Spinning, 1891-1935,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 91 (May 1977): 195-219. 
Using an innovative econometric procedure and drawing on abundant historical data, this paper 
develops an account of technological change and productivity growth in Japanese textiles during 
the era of its rise to world leadership in this industry.  The basic strategy is to treat the parameters 
of the conventional production function as conditional on nonconventional inputs.  Changes in 
these parameters are shown to account for most observed productivity change, with biases that 
shifted across historical phases.   [Saxonhouse expounded this methodology more formally in 
“Regressions Using Samples Having Different Characteristics,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 59 (May 1977): 234-237.]  Remarkably, relatively modest changes in worker 
experience, primary education, and length of shift account for the very large growth in 
productivity over the period.    
“Working Koreans in Korea and Japan in the Interwar Period,” Japanese translation in T. 
Nakamura (ed.), Senkanki No Nihon Keizai Bunseki, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan Sha, 
1980, pp. 356-398.  
Previously published only in Japanese, this paper asks the extent to which the bases for modern 
Korean growth lay in the interwar period of Japanese occupation.  One of the paper’s main data 
sources is a comprehensive 1940 census of the Korean population, previously thought to have 
survived only in truncated form.  A complete copy was discovered by Saxonhouse in 1978 in the 
Population Studies Center at the University of Michigan.  On the basis of this evidence, the paper 
shows that the Korean industrial labor force did not in fact decline between 1930 and 1940, as 
official data appear to show.  The paper then elaborates an econometric production-function 
framework, in which management quality can be identified separately from worker quality by 
nationality.  The results show that the quality of Korean-managed firms improved markedly 
between 1914 and 1928, though they remained somewhat behind the Japanese.  The elasticity of 
substitution between Japanese and Korean workers also increased over time, as Japanese 
managers became less prejudiced and better able to make productive use of Koreans.  
“Two Forms of Cheap Labor in Textile History,” with Gavin Wright, in Gary R. 
Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright (eds.), Technique, Spirit and Form:  The Making of Modern 
Economies, Supplement 3 to Research in Economic History.  Greenwich, CT:  JAI Press, 
1984, 3-31.   
The early New England textile industry featured two alternative organizational forms: the 
Waltham system in which young women lived in dormitories while working in the mills for a 
brief period of their lives; and the Rhode Island or Slater system of company-supplied housing 
and employment on a family basis.  In the two great triumphs of cheap-labor competitors in the 
next phase of textiles history, Japan emulated Waltham while the U.S. South followed Slater.  
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of these choices.  The first section interprets 
the initial choices as rational responses to conditions of labor supply, specifically the degree of 
labor-market development and security of farm tenure.  Subsequent sections argue that once in 
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place, each system had its own internal evolutionary logic, generating very different patterns of 
job assignments, wage trajectories, and skill development over time.  The larger point is the 
malleability of industrial technology in its use of various types of labor. 
“Rings and Mules Around the World: A Comparative Study in Technological Choice,” 
(with Gavin Wright), in Gary R. Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright (eds.), Technique, Spirit 
and Form in the Making of the Modern Economies: Essays in Honor of William N. Parker.  
Research in Economic History, Supplement 3: 271-300. JAI Press, 1984. [A shortened 
version of this essay appeared as “Technology Choice in Cotton Textile Manufacturing,” in 
Kazuchi Ohkawa and Gustav Ranis (eds.), Japan and the Developing Countries: 212-235.] 
This paper considers the decisions by textile firms to adopt ring versus mule spinning machines 
between the 1870s and the 1930s.  Drawing on newly developed data from the records of British 
textile machinery firms, the authors are able to move the discussion beyond purely binational 
comparisons (British vs. American, Japan vs. India) to track adoption decisions in many 
countries around the world.  Whereas British firms have been criticized for technological 
conservatism, the paper shows that the demand for mules was strong in many other countries 
before World War I, including France, Germany, India, Russia, and Canada.  The paper argues 
that a country’s initial choice was closely related to the quality of domestic cotton fibers, the 
mule being the preferred choice for spinning short-staple Asian cottons.  The British equivalent 
was the proximity of highly developed markets in raw cotton and yarn, for which the highly 
flexible mule was well adapted. 
“New Evidence on the Stubborn English Mule and the Cotton Industry, 1878-1920,” with 
Gavin Wright, Economic History Review 37:4, pp. 507-19, November 1984. 
Thus paper deploys the evidence on sales of British textile machinery to address the debate over 
Britain’s delay in switching from the mule to the ring.  The new data show that the British 
preference for the mule extended to low-count as well as high-count yarns, and hence cannot be 
explained as a simple consequence of product composition. The authors go on to argue that these 
choices were not “constrained” by the industry’s industrial structure, because many new firms 
entered during the boom years 1900-1907, freely choosing both vertical specialization and the 
mule.  Instead, these choices reflected a positive belief in the superiority of the mule on the part 
of the British technological community, which did not foresee its obsolescence as of the 1920s.  
"Stubborn Mules and Vertical Integration:  The Disappearing Constraint?," with Gavin 
Wright, Economic History Review, 40:1, February 1987, 87-94.  
This note responds to a critique by William Lazonick [“Stubborn Mules: Some Comments,” 
Economic History Review 40 (1987), 80-86], restating his view that British preference for the 
mule reflected constraints associated with vertical specialization.  The authors respond that the 
term “constraint” seems to have no objective meaning in this usage.  In their view, Lancashire’s 
positive preference for both vertical specialization and the mule is confirmed by its indifference 
towards rings equipped with paper tubes instead of wooden bobbins, an innovation whose sole 
purpose was adapting ring spinning to a vertically-specialized structure.   The authors conclude 
by calling again for a multilateral comparative approach.  
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“Technology Choice and the Quality Dimension in the Japanese Cotton Textile Industry,” 
with Gustav Ranis, in Kazuchi Ohkawa and Gustav Ranis (eds.), Japan and the Developing 
Countries.  Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1985, 156-76. 
This paper considers tradeoffs among dimensions of cloth quality and their relationships to 
varying scarcity and quality of productive inputs, in the Japanese cotton textile industry between 
1906 and 1935.  The authors begin by estimating implicit prices for fifteen attributes of yarn and 
cloth, using a hedonic price regression.  They proceed to estimate derived product-attribute 
supply functions and derived input-demand functions.  The main general conclusion is that lower 
product quality was strongly associated with more labor intensive production methods.  
Increased formal education, in contrast, was associated with higher product quality and increased 
use of American raw cotton. The commercial success of the industry reflected the creative 
exploration of these complementarity and substitution possibilities.   
“Supply and Demand for Quality Workers in Cotton Spinning in Japan and India” (with 
Yukihiko Kiyokawa), in Kazuchi Ohkawa and Gustav Ranis (eds.), Japan and the 
Developing Countries.  Basil Blackwell, 1985: 177-211. 
This paper presents a systematic comparison of labor force and working conditions for Indian 
and Japanese cotton spinning firms, between the 1890s and the 1930s.  The Japanese data are 
richer, based on a unique, nearly-universal 1997 survey, allowing the estimation of a wage-
determination system of supply and demand equations.  [These results were first presented in 
Saxonhouse, “The Supply of Quality Workers and the Demand for Quality in Jobs in Japan’s 
Early Industrialization,” Explorations in Economic History 15 (1978), 40-68.]  The analysis 
shows that Japanese workers chose jobs for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary reasons. Poorer, 
less stable workers cared mainly about money wages, while older, more experienced workers 
were willing to trade off money wages for a shorter workweek and better dormitory life (but not, 
apparently, for lower mortality rates).  The Indian data reflect an entirely different pattern: 
mostly male, less productive,  loosely supervised, with high rates of absenteeism.  The authors 
conclude: “It is evident that the acquisition of a mature, stable labor force does not necessarily 
result in industrial success.” 
“Determinants of Technology Choice:  The Indian and Japanese Cotton Industries,” with 
Gustav Ranis, in Kazuchi Ohkawa and Gustav Ranis (eds.), Japan and the Developing 
Countries.  Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1985, 135-55. 
The Indian and Japanese cotton textile industries had substantially similar conditions at the 
beginning of the 1880s, but Japanese production, productivity, and exports grew much more 
rapidly in subsequent decades.  This paper analyzes the contrast, emphasizing the Japanese 
industry’s success in adapting technology, work organization and product mix to a labor-
abundant setting.  For example, Japanese mills employed primarily females and ran two shifts, 
whereas Indian mills used mainly males and ran only a single shift.  In the 1890s, the Japanese 
adopted ring spinning technology complemented with labor-intensive cotton-mixing processes, 
while the Indians were slow to switch from the mule to the ring.  The paper discusses likely 
reasons for India’s lag, including restraints on entry, consumer demand for finer-count yarns, the 
management-agency system, and reliance on British advice. 
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“Mechanisms for Technology Transfer in Japanese Economic History,” Managerial and 
Decision Economics 12:2, Winter 1991, 83-92.   
This paper considers the institutional bases for inter-firm technology transfer in the Japanese 
cotton textile industry, before and after World War I.  Prior to the war, a remarkable uniformity 
prevailed in technology and practice, maintained by explicit inter-firm cooperation through the 
industry association (Bōren) and/or the engineering staff of Platt Brothers, the chief supplier of 
textile machinery.  These mechanisms declined during the interwar period, but inter-firm 
technological cooperation was nonetheless supported by informal cooperation among 
professionally-oriented textile engineers, participants in an extremely active labor market for 
technical personnel.  This was in marked contrast to the postwar permanent employment system.   
“Structural Change and Japanese Economic History:  Will the 21st Century Be Different?” 
American Economic Review 88:2, Papers and Proceedings, May 1998, 408-11. 
This paper presents a broad overview of the bases for Japan’s high-growth performance in the 
twentieth century.  Rapid accumulation of human capital was an important early factor, 
improving the country’s ability to absorb technologies from abroad, and subsequently to generate 
new technologies domestically.  Japan’s institutional arrangements, contrary to widespread 
impressions abroad, have been continually changing and adapting throughout the century.  The 
distinctive postwar system, featuring bank-oriented financial control, permanent employment, 
and government-sponsored industrial policy, was very different from earlier forms, and changed 
substantially after 1973.   Thus, Japan’s growth record should not be attributed to any one 
configuration of its economic institutions. 
“Technological Evolution in Cotton Spinning, 1878-1933,” with Gavin Wright, in D. Farnie 
and D. Jeremy (eds,), The Fibre that Changed the World.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp. 129-52. 
This paper returns to the issue of rings versus mules, with a more complete global data set 
derived from the British textile-machinery company records.  The authors observe that the earlier 
debate focused on rationalizing choices between the two techniques, but not on the evolution of 
the underlying technologies.  The new data allow such a study, based on the detailed technical 
specifications found in the orders, including such variables as: machine size, speed, yarn count, 
twist versus weft, and the cotton varieties for which the machine was suited.  The evidence 
presented shows that both rings and mules advanced in size and speed between 1878 and 1914, 
with no decisive performance difference between them.  The ring gained market share over time, 
however, by expanding the range of its capability, as measured by the yarn count for which the 
machine was designed.  The most rapid increases in yarn counts occurred in Japan and Mexico, 
where progress in machine manufacture complemented improvements in labor quality and 
management.    
“How Japan First Began to Export Machine-Made Manufactures to East Asia,” Japan 
Economic Review 56:4, December 2005, 431-40. 
This paper analyzes inter-firm differences in export activity, using data from the cotton industry 
at the turn of the 20th century.  The first shipment of cotton yarn to China occurred only in 1890, 
and at that time the subject of export trade was considered an appropriate matter for industry-
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wide discussion and collective action.  The difficulty in arriving at a common position is 
illuminated by the discrete choice model estimated in the paper, which shows that firm-level 
variables (size, yarn quality, age of capital stock) had significant effects on the firm’s propensity 
to export.  These results suggest that sunk costs of trading constituted an important barrier to 
deep regional economic integration.     
“Hachirō Fukuhara, The Scholar-Statesman, Ring Spinner, and Industrial Spy?”  April 
2006, unpublished. 
Originally, delivered as an address to the Sixth Annual Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies, 
this paper presents an account of the activities of Hachiro Fukuhara, who served from 1901 to 
1903 as the Special Agent of Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in the United 
States.  Fukuhara made detailed studies of the American textile industry, including many visits to 
machine shops to gain knowledge that might foster Japanese production of textiles machinery.  
The project took an unexpected turn, however, when Fukuhara took an eight-month position as a 
ring spinner at the Durham Cotton Mill in North Carolina (obtained through the intervention of 
Benjamin Duke, whose family owned the cotton mill in addition to their tobacco operations).  As 
a result of his observations, Fukuhara recommended that the Japanese industry adopt the family-
based mill-village system then in use in the American South. This unrealistic recommendation 
had no success in Japan.  But the paper uses the detailed production data gathered by Fukuhara to 
show that within five years of his report, the Japanese industry virtually matched the productivity 
performance of the U.S. mills.  
Chapter 2  A Tale of Technological Diffusion in the Meiji Period 
Chapter 3 Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the 
Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry 
Chapter 4 Productivity Change and Labor Absorption in Japanese Cotton 
Spinning, 1891-1935 
Chapter 5 Working Koreans in Korea and Japan in the Interwar Period 
Chapter 6 Two Forms of Cheap Labor in Textile History 
Chapter 7 Rings and Mules Around the World: A Comparative Study in 
Technological Choice 
Chapter 8 New Evidence on the Stubborn English Mule and the Cotton 
Industry, 1878-1920 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
Introduction 
The papers contained in Volume 1 deal with various facets of Japan’s economic history, 
including especially Japan’s development of its domestic textile industry following the Meiji 
period in the 19th century.  The papers in this Volume 2 cover topics in Japanese technological 
development and innovation, Japan’s comparative advantage, trade, and trade policies, and 
Japanese macro/financial issues and policies.  Saxonhouse’s curriculum vitae is also included. 
Overview 
A. Technology and Innovation 
“Industrial Restructuring in Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Summer 1979, pp. 273-
319.  Reprinted in D. Okimoto and T. Rohlen (eds.), Inside the Japanese System:  Studies in 
Society and Political Economy, Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1988. 
Japan experienced dramatic structural adjustment between 1955 and the early 1970s in response 
to internal changes that were occurring.  Successful Japanese industrial performance and 
Japanese thriftiness changed Japan to a capital-rich country.  Individuals who were the product 
of Japan’s already comprehensive educational opportunity were given the opportunity to gain 
relevant industrial experience and thereby changed Japan to a skill-rich economy. However, high 
energy prices, slow growth, yen appreciation, and competition from less developed countries had 
a profound impact on Japanese industrial structure in the second half of the 1970s.  It is 
noteworthy that there was substantial sectoral variation across Japanese industries, with some 
sectors performing well and others experiencing stressful adjustment.  The Japanese government 
introduced a number of policies to deal with its depressed industries in an effort to mitigate the 
adjustment problems being experienced. 
“What Is All This About ‘Industrial Targeting’ in Japan?”  The World Economy 6:3, 
September 1983, 253-74. 
In examining the various instruments of industrial policy, Saxonhouse notes that Japan gives less 
formal assistance to its high-technology sectors as compared to most other advanced 
industrialized countries.  Targeting is largely reserved for Japanese agriculture.  Japan’s high-
profile government intervention is best understood as a response to Japan’s distinctive 
institutions as a means of accumulating capital and labor skills.  Japan’s industrial policy should 
be viewed accordingly as an effort to overcome the distortions resulting from the absence of well 
developed capital markets.  In this same light, Japan’s government-sponsored cooperative R&D 
projects should be understood as an effort to insure that the barriers to informal inter-firm 
transfer of information created by Japanese employment practices does not slow down the pace 
of technology diffusion within Japan.  Saxonhouse concludes that there is nothing abnormal 
about Japan’s trade and industrial patterns.  Japan’s high-profile but mostly informal industrial 
policy should thus be viewed as a means of addressing the drawbacks of its financial system. 
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“Biotechnology in Japan:  Industrial Policy and Factor Market Distortions,” Prometheus 
3:2, December 1985, 277-314. 
There is a widespread feeling that the Japanese government is unfairly acquiring for its economy 
the few really good tickets to prosperity in the twenty-first century. Foreign reactions to Japanese 
targeting have ranged from concern that such practices are unfair and inconsistent with the 
international economic system and that Japan should be forced to eliminate them, to intense 
admiration and a hope the other countries can somehow emulate Japan. Understanding Japanese 
practices, particularly as they relate to high technology industries, requires an analysis not only 
of the relationships between government and business in Japan, but also of the relationships 
between government and education and between education and business. From the perspective of 
an analysis of the inter-relationships between these institutions, it is possible to understand the 
character of the market distortions and market failures with which Japanese policy has sought to 
cope.  It should also then be possible to assess whether other countries face a similar set of 
problems requiring similar interventions. These analyses will proceed with particular focus on 
the development of the biotechnology industry in Japan and the United States. 
“Industrial Policy and Factor Markets:  Biotechnology in Japan and the United States,” in 
H. Patrick (ed.), Japan’s High Technology Industries.  Seattle:  University of Washington 
Press, 1986, 97-135. 
This paper discusses Japanese government policy to develop the biotechnology industry, 
considering the industrial policy tools of trade policy (tariffs, which were low), product 
standards, government subsidies and grants, tax policy, capital availability, regulation of market 
structure, and funding (the lack of a Japanese venture capital market). The basic conclusion is 
that the Japanese government was giving “less financial aid and comfort to its high technology 
sectors and to biotechnology in particular than do the governments of most other advanced 
industrialized economies,” including the United States. 
“Technology and the Future of the Economy,” in K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba (eds.),  The 
Political Economy of Japan, Volume 1:  The Domestic Transformation.  Stanford, CA:  
Stanford University Press, 1987, pp. 385-419. 
This paper focuses on Japan’s R&D system, and discusses three ways in which it is different 
from the U.S. system: the larger role of small companies in Japan; the (limited) role of the 
Japanese government in R&D funding; and the advanced training for technical personnel located 
more in firms than educational institutions. It has tables with comparative data on productivity 
change, and patenting, and it discusses differences in government policies, corporate 
environments, and organizational structures. 
 “Technological Progress and R&D Systems in Japan and the United States,” in Cecil H. 
Uyehara (ed.), U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Exchange:  Patterns of Interdependence.  
Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1988, 29-54. 
This paper notes that Japan’s technological progress in the period under study has outstripped the 
performance of all the other advanced industrialized economies.  Japan’s technological success 
was built on a rapid increase in its commitment of resources to R&D.  Differing fiscal choices 
made in Japan and in the United States have shaped the R&D systems in both countries.  
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Japanese firms have played a critical role in the training of scientists and engineers in contrast to 
the U.S. economy’s pervasive extra-firm training programs and market allocation of experienced 
personnel.  As a consequence, in the United States, large amounts of potentially proprietary and 
technological information readily become global public goods.  Japanese government science 
and technology policy has been designed to ensure that the barriers to inter-firm transfer of 
information created by Japanese employment practices do not slow the pace of technology 
diffusion within Japan. 
“Japanese High Technology, Government Policy, and Evolving Comparative Advantage in 
Goods and Services,” in V. Canto and K. Dietrich (eds.), Industrial Policy and International 
Trade.  Greenwich, CT:  JAI Press, 1992, 139-66. 
This paper develops and expands Saxonhouse’s earlier published discussion of the role of 
Japanese industrial policy as a way of dealing with imperfect and rigid capital and labor markets. 
It discusses (briefly) the governments’ comparative research programs for VSLI electronic chips 
and other areas, and their various difficulties. The appendix presents the formal framework of his 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model that is extended to technological services as well as 
goods. 
“Optoelectronics in Japan:  A Market Evaluation of Government High-Technology 
Policy,” Managerial and Decision Economics 18:2, March 1997, 177-193. 
Insofar as aggregate fiscal support is concerned, there appears to be little basis for the view 
firmly expressed by U.S. optoelectronic firms that Japanese government financial aid has played 
a critical role in the development of Japanese optoelectronics.  Direct grants and tax expenditures 
in Japan over a 15-year period are less than what the U.S. government provides to the American 
industry in a single year.  While over 90% of U.S. funding is defense-related, much of this 
funding appears to have direct commercial relevance.  The Japanese optoelectronics industry 
finds MITI’s role as marginal at best and more likely a nuisance.  Japanese assistance does not 
have a significant impact on equity prices, whereas American equity values have a strong and 
significant negative impact.  Japan has reached a point of technological maturity such that even 
signaling to the private sector is troublesome. 
“Technological and Information Transfer:  How do Some Nations Learn what Other 
Nations Know?  Japan’s Experience,” Pacific Review 12:2, 1999, 223-45. 
The returns to the rapid acceleration in the growth of GDP per capita in the past century and a 
quarter have been very inequitably distributed across nations. Nations that were already 
relatively wealthy in 1870 have received most of the benefits of this increase in material well-
being. Japan is thus far the only major example of a country that has been able to fully traverse 
the vast gulf that separates poorer from wealthier nations. Lately other economies in East Asia 
have experienced such sustained high rates of growth in GDP per capita as to suggest they too 
will join Japan as non-Western examples of the world's wealthiest nations. Some doubt has been 
cast on these optimistic projections by findings that economies such as Taiwan and Korea have 
grown rapidly, seemingly Soviet-bloc style, without the benefit of rapid growth in total factor 
productivity (TFP) change. Characterizing growth without TFP change as Stalinist, however, is 
ahistorical. The United States, the United Kingdom and Japan among other nations, all 
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experienced long periods of rapid growth in per capita GDP without simultaneously experiencing 
rapid increases in TFP. In each instance, such phases were succeeded by periods where per 
capita GDP growth was increasingly augmented by improvements in TFP.  
One puzzle here is that the periods characterized by little TFP change do appear to be times 
when substantial technological improvement was taking place. In the case of the United States, 
there is considerable evidence that the extraordinary increases in factor accumulation were 
driven by what appear to be substantial advances in technology. A case study of the cotton textile 
industry suggests much the same may have been true in Japan. The character of the product 
markets and the factor markets faced by the Japanese cotton-spinning industry in the Meiji 
period created an environment within which technological adaptation and innovation came to be 
a network phenomenon with the industry's trade association and the industry's prime machinery 
supplier serving as a critical link. Later with product market and credit market changes, the role 
these institutions played diminished to be replaced by information transfers that were the by-
product of a very well-functioning market in experienced, and by the standards of other nations, 
very well-educated textile engineers.  
In the half-century after 1945, the rise of permanent employment practices in Japan has created 
barriers to information flows and collective technological innovation and adaptation that were so 
much a part of the experience of Japan's leading industry in the early 20th century. Curiously, 
this is just the time when TFP change has become an important component of Japan's very rapid 
growth in per capita GDP. The past half-century has also been a time when the Japanese 
government has been actively involved in attempting to shape industrial structure in an otherwise 
market-based economy. One set of policy instruments that has attracted particular attention 
overseas has been government-sponsored R&D consortia. These consortia can be thought of as 
government programs designed to break down the walls preventing information flows among 
Japanese firms. Japan's cooperative R&D projects can be thought of as ways to capture some of 
the benefits of American-style and pre-war Japanese-style labor markets, even while continuing 
to avoid some of the costs associated with relatively high labor mobility. There is great 
disagreement as to the efficacy of these Japanese government programs, with overseas firms 
looking enviously at projects that Japanese industry sees as having only minor significance or 
worse. A study of the impact of two Japanese government-sponsored opto-electronics projects on 
Japanese and American equity markets confirms these differing perceptions, confirms that the 
speed with which information diffuses back from Japan to the United States has increased 
substantially over the past decade, but does not suggest which of the two differing perceptions is 
correct. Knowledge-based growth may have proceeded this last half-century in Japan with less 
inter-firm diffusion of technology than was characteristic at some points earlier in Japan's 
history.  
In the very late 20th century, changes in global markets and the uncertainty of life close to the 
technological frontier are forcing changes in Japanese institutions. Japanese firms of the future 
may prefer to have their labor force bear more both of the risks associated with specialized 
training and the risks associated with secular and cyclical demand shocks. Much as Japan's labor 
force did early in the 20th century, such steps will require a change in the way in which training 
is provided and changes in the Japanese government's educational and social policies. At the 
same time, the type of information-flow problems the government-sponsored R&D consortia 
were once designed to address may well be as insignificant in the future as they once may have 
been in Japan's past. In contrast, the type of institutions supporting technological diffusion in 
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Japan's textile industry in the 1920s and early 1930s may be part of Japan's future. On the basis 
of the evidence presented here, the answer to the question whether Taiwan, Korea and other East 
and Southeast Asian countries seeking to follow Japan's full transition to very high standards of 
material well-being and knowledge-based growth should avoid or emulate Japan's institutional 
set-up of the past half-century is not at all obvious. 
“R&D Consortia, News, and Japanese High-Technology Policy: Optoelectronics in Japan,” 
in M. Aoki and G.R .Saxonhouse  (eds.), Finance, Development, and Competition in Japan.  
Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 212-38. 
This is the last of Saxonhouse’s high-tech series of papers.  It begins with a prologue of how and 
why the United States in 1993 suddenly and dramatically changed its trade policy towards R&D 
subsidies in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  Saxonhouse then uses the development of the 
optoelectronics industry in Japan as a case study in Japanese industrial policy. He points out that 
the U.S. government did far more than did Japan to promote the U.S. optoelectronics industry. 
He traces the Japanese government’s role in some detail, considering the standard policy 
instruments, including:  funding; tax policy; and especially government–sponsored research 
consortia (in which the government’s role was marginal at best). He carries out an event study of 
the equity performance of Japanese and American optoelectronic firms, laying out the equation 
system to specify his estimates. 
B. Comparative Advantage, Trade, and Trade Policies 
“Evolving Comparative Advantage and Japan’s Imports of Manufactures,” in K. 
Yamamura (ed.), Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy.  Seattle:  University of 
Washington Press, 1982, pp. 239-69. 
It was often maintained that the comparatively small ratio of Japan’s imports of manufactures to 
total imports was evidence of Japan’s restrictive trade policy.  In response to domestic and 
international pressures, there was an acceleration of the liberalization of Japan’s trade policies in 
the early 1970s.  Nonetheless, Japan’s import ratio remained well below the levels for other 
advanced economies.  Using the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model for 
estimation purposes, Saxonhouse concludes that special undefined Japanese characteristics or 
particular foreign failures in the Japanese market do not play a central role in explaining the 
postwar pattern of Japan’s trade.  He argues that his results suggest that the commercial policy 
and attitudinal changes of the 1970s did not greatly alter the structure of Japan’s imports.  This 
was not because of foreign cultural insensitivity to Japan, but because Japan’s policies involved 
only relatively small distortions.  When the differing quantity and quality of Japanese labor, 
capital, natural resources, and distance are properly given their full allowance, the Japanese share 
of manufactures in total imports is comparable to European and American experiences.  
“The Micro- and Macroeconomics of Foreign Sales to Japan,” in W. Cline (ed.), Trade 
Policy in the 1980s.  Washington, D.C.:  Institute for International Economics, 1983, pp. 
259-304. 
Saxonhouse notes that it is widely believed that foreign access to the Japanese home market has 
been tightly controlled.  This belief has such widespread credence that it may come as a shock 
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when he documents that the traditional indices of the international economic system suggest that 
foreign access to the Japanese market would have to be considered excellent. Yet the question 
remains that Japan’s imports of manufactured goods appear low by conventional indices and as a 
percentage of GDP.  In this connection, Saxonhouse stresses the distinctive endowments of the 
Japanese economy that have shaped its trade structure, and, in this light, Japan does not differ 
appreciably in foreign access as compared to other advanced economies.  He further argues that 
the removal of Japan’s illiberal trade barriers would have a negligible impact on Japan’s 
persistent current account surplus.  He notes, however, that there may be scope for the 
liberalization of Japanese agricultural policies and the capital movements. 
“Services in the Japanese Economy,” in R. Inman (ed.), Managing the Service Economy.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 53-83 
Saxonhouse reviews the performance and role of Japan’s services sector in the pre-1945 period.  
He next considers the first four decades of the postwar period, including an assessment of the 
future growth and productivity performance of Japan’s services and their relation to the future 
growth and productivity performance of the Japanese economy as a whole.  He then examines 
Japan’s service industries in a comparative context, in particular Japan’s distribution system and 
the distinctively small exports of technology services.  Saxonhouse concludes that the 
development of Japan’s services sector is remarkably consistent with international patterns.  The 
rapid changes in services that have occurred reflect the rapid changes in the economy as a whole, 
stemming in particular from the growth in Japan’s aggregate capital stock and improvement in 
the quality of Japanese labor and the education embodied in that labor. 
“Comparative Advantage, Structural Adaptation, and Japanese Performance,” in T. 
Inoguchi and D. Okimoto (eds.), The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2:  The Changing 
International Context.  Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1988, pp. 225-48. 
This paper reviews the role of structural change in the economic performance of the advanced 
industrialized economies, with a particular focus on Japan.  A significant question is whether the 
international commercial relations of the advanced economies will become more or less 
important as a source of structural change compared to the first four decades after WWII.  
Japan’s rapid growth after WWII was accompanied by dramatic shifts in the allocation of 
resources, but there are several other countries that had similar experiences of structural change, 
such as Italy and Korea.  Saxonhouse develops an empirical framework to explain how the 
growth of domestic resources may alter the trade structure and how trade may affect the 
reallocation of resources.  He shows that the major industrialized economies have become 
increasingly integrated since WWII as a force for inducing structural change. He reviews finally 
the distinctive characteristics of Japanese institutions as the basis for Japan’s economic success 
and takes issue with the pressures being brought to bear to harmonize these institutions along the 
lines of other major economies. 
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“An Analytical Survey of Formal and Informal Barriers to International Trade and 
Investment in the United States, Canada, and Japan,” with R. M. Stern, in R. M. Stern 
(ed.), Trade and Investment Relations Among the United States, Canada, and Japan.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 293-353. 
This paper lists the major categories of nontariff measures and related policies that are widely 
used, and distinctions are drawn between formal and informal barriers and their rationale and 
possible consequences, with a focus on the United States, Canada, and Japan.  There is a 
discussion of the conceptual issues involved in measuring the barriers.  The major empirical 
efforts undertaken to estimate the extent to which Japan’s barriers set it apart from the United 
States, Canada, and other major countries are reviewed and some new results are presented.  The 
model used for estimation purposes is set out in a Technical Appendix.  The conclusion of the 
paper is that there is not much evidence for the contention that Japan relies on a variety of 
informal barriers to influence the structure of its trade.  Further, when cross-national differences 
in factor endowments are taken into account, Japan’s trade structure does not appear distinctive 
relative to other major countries.  The evidence on foreign direct investment was inconclusive. 
“Economic Growth and Trade Relations:  Japanese Performance in Long-Term 
Perspective,” in Anne Krueger and Takatoshi. Ito (eds.), Trade and Protectionism.  
Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1993, pp. 149-79. 
Japanese trade structure has been historically distinguished by a low level of manufacturing 
exports, a pattern widely attributed to protectionist distortions of comparative advantage.   This 
paper argues that the pattern is better understood as a consequence of Japan’s unusual factor 
endowments (low natural resources, high-quality labor) and high savings rates, compared to 
other advanced countries of the world.  Elsewhere indices of intraindustry trade have been high 
and rising; this has not been true of Japan, whose trade with other advanced countries has been 
largely “difference-based” (and hence subject to political opposition abroad).  Extending his 
1989 study noted above, Saxonhouse develops a “factor-endowment-based theory of 
intraindustry trade,” and proceeds to estimation of intraindustry trade equations and import share 
equations for a sample of 24 economies in 1983.  The results show that Japanese trade structure 
can be captured within tolerance intervals generated without Japanese observations. This finding 
is consistent with Saxonhouse’s earlier study by showing that the result holds even when the 
sample is restricted to high-income, relatively open countries. 
“What Does Japanese Trade Structure Tell Us About Japanese Trade Policy?”  Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 7:3, Summer 1993, 21-43. 
Saxonhouse notes that economic research provides little evidence that Japan’s trade regime is 
different.  Yet it is widely believed that Japan engages in unfair trade practices on a broad scale.  
He further points out that Japan’s productivity growth and structural transformation have 
outstripped every other major industrialized economy in the second half of the 20th century.  This 
is not an accident, and it rests on Japan’s long history of growth and structural change prior to its 
opening to trade in the 19th century.  He stresses that Japan’s geography differs greatly from 
other major countries.  Its poor endowment of natural resources has been combined with a high 
quality labor force and unusually thrifty households.  These circumstances thus can help to 
explain Japan’s relatively low level of manufactured goods imports and its limited participation 
in intra-industry trade.  Neither the price behavior of Japanese firms nor the pattern and volume 
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of Japan’s trade suggests that its trade regime is different.  Some of Japan’s economic institutions 
may be distinctive, but there is little evidence that they produce outcomes that distort the 
international economic system. 
“Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia,” in J. Frankel and M. Kahler (eds.), 
Regionalism and Rivalry:  Japan and the U.S. in Pacific Asia.  Chicago: University of 
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as to whether Japanese strategic pricing varied among the NAFTA markets, and he concludes  
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impose no more unwanted structural changes on its trading partners than the median advanced 
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